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Ha ¨yry, M., Chadwick, R., Vilhja ´lmur, A. and Arnason,
G. (eds.): 2007, The Ethics and Governance of Human
Genetic Databases. European Perspectives. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 296 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-
85662-1. Price: $95.00.
Human genetic databases (HGDs) are collections of
samples and data from large numbers of citizens that are
being established in order to study interactions between
genes and the environment and promise new insights for
diseases and their treatments. The involvement of com-
mercial companies and the risks to conﬁdentiality of data
and samples stored in HGDs have stirred considerable
debate.
Iceland, Estonia, Sweden and the UK were among the
ﬁrst European countries to plan population-wide HGDs.
From 2002 to 2004, the European Commission funded
research on the Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of
Human Genetic Databases (ELSAGEN) in these four
countries. The book provides an overview about the results
of the various parts of this research. After a general
reﬂection on American principles and European values, the
ﬁrst part summarises surveys of the public regarding con-
cerns related to genetic databases. This is followed by a
comparative analysis of the legal frameworks regulating
HGDs in the four countries. Chapters on ‘‘ethical ques-
tions’’ and ‘‘political considerations’’ conclude the work.
Through the glasses of the public and the ELSAGEN
team of these 4 countries, the wider European and inter-
national stakes are regularly targeted. Are countries
‘‘participating in an international ‘gene race’’’ (Estonian
newspaper, quoted p. 79 by P. Tammpuu)? Is a HGD
‘‘responsible biotechnology’’ (R. Kattel, p. 239)? Is the
term ‘‘global public good’’ appropriate for HGDs, or are
they mainly increasing the risk for indigenous people to be
exploited (S. Wilson and R. Chadwick, p. 158)? Should
HGD-legislation respond to concerns of the public or
should it rather incorporate a more abstract viewpoint of
‘‘European justice’’ (M. Ha ¨yry and T. Takala, p. 256)?
The book is a very rich source to learn more about
sociological, legal and ethical issues concerning the HGDs
in the four countries. It is interesting to read that Icelanders,
Estonians and Swedes seem to trust more in genetic science
than the UK population. Since the methodologies used
seemed to have been considerably different in the four
countries, a more detailed description of the questionnaires
used would have been helpful to understand such
comparisons.
The book mirrors perhaps best the debate in that it
oscillates considerably between optimism and pessimism.
G. Arnason believes that the impact of HGDs is often
exaggerated. ‘‘Science and medicine will also do very well
without them’’ (p. 235). The legal analysis conﬁrms that
‘‘governance structures for population genetic databases
are not uniform or harmonious across Europe’’ (J. Kaye, p.
141). This demonstrates a ‘‘pressing need for governance
reform, particularly vis-a `-vis biosamples’’ (S.M.C. Gib-
bons, p. 140). ‘‘Trust’’ and ‘‘trustworthy institutions’’ are
mentioned repeatedly in the book as a means to overcome
difﬁculties related to consent and conﬁdentiality. If ‘‘par-
ticipants have good reasons to believe that they can trust
the institutions which regulate the research, the people who
work with the information and also the technical system
which protects it, the issue of privacy should not be a major
obstacle in the effort to balance participants’ interests and
scientiﬁc research interests’’ (V. Arnason, p. 5).
Is trust more than a ‘‘magic medicine’’ for the problems
related to HGDs? M. Sutrop (p. 190f) urges that trust
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and evaluation of risk, asking for guaranties and for trust-
worthy institutions that do not have conﬂicts of interests.
Wherever the future of HDGs lies, the book is an
authentic contribution for the struggle to ﬁnd adequate
legal, ethical and socio-political solutions in Europe.
Bernice Elger
Geneva, Switzerland
Novak, D.: 2007, The Sanctity of Human Life. Wash-
ington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 186 pp. ISBN
978-1589011762. Price: $34.95.
This short book contains three essays, based on public
lectures, on the subjects of stem cell research, socialized
medicine and assisted death to terminal patients. David
Novak, a professor in Toronto University and a rabbi has
published extensively on Jewish theology, applied ethics
and bioethics. He is also the author of the entry on Judaism
in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. A student of the Thomist
Grisez, Novak has labored throughout his career on the
reconstruction of ‘‘natural law’’ within Jewish ethics.
Unsurprisingly, his positions in all three topics discussed in
the book are in line with contemporary Catholic doctrines
and are sometimes in stark discord with the positions held
by virtually every rabbi specializing in bioethical prob-
lems, particularly on the ‘‘beginning of life’’ questions.
NovakisanoriginalandcourageousvoiceinJudaism.His
argumentation is forceful, brilliantly articulated, well roun-
ded, nuanced and compelling. Few other Jewish authors
encompass such breadth and depth in theology, political
theory, ethics and rabbinics altogether. It is a shame that his
work has not been translated into Hebrew and is not known
by other rabbis dealing with bioethical questions. Those
familiar with rabbinic argumentations in favor of stem cell
research cannot avoid appreciating Novak’s counter argu-
ments.Neithersideisfreefromtwistsofexegesisandﬂawed
logic. So why does the prevalent consensus in the rabbinic
world differ so much from Novak’s teachings?
Regrettably, Novak does not explore the moral and
theological conviction behind contending rabbinic rulings,
he merely dismisses them as based on excessive casuistry
(pilpul) which is lacking in due regard for the gravity of
human life (p. 42). This is unfair, even condescending.
More troubling still are some of Novak’s assertions, such
as ‘‘abortion is still largely the recourse of persons who
either did not practice birth control or whose birth control
failed them’’ in the context of fornication (p. 70). This is a
gross distortion of the facts known about women seeking
elective abortion, particularly in poor societies.
Another disturbing example is his opinion that natural
ethics is not possible for agnostics, whose only recourse is
extreme legal positivism (p. 9). One would expect a phi-
losophy professor in Toronto to know better.
If Novak had more respect for and curiosity in con-
temporary rabbinic ethics (let alone secular bioethics) and
if those rabbis listen to Novak’s deep, well thought and
comprehensive reasoning, Jewish bioethics would beneﬁt
immensely.
This book is a must-read for any scholar of Jewish
bioethics. Readers less familiar with the ﬁeld who seek a
map charting the waters of Jewish medical ethics and law
are likely to be disappointed. Novak’s words will lead them
in fruitful and engaging directions, but the sails of all other
rabbis have followed other winds.
Y. Michael Barilan
Tel Aviv, Israel
Ehm, S. and Schicktanz, S. (eds.): 2006, Ko ¨rper als
Maß? Biomedizinische Eingriffe und ihre Auswirkungen
auf Ko ¨rper- und Identita ¨tsversta ¨ndnisse. Stuttgart: Hirzel
Verlag. 254 pp. ISBN 3-7776-1382-7. Price: €12.50.
One of the central topics discussed in this collective
volume is the assertion of the dominant role played by
natural science when viewing the human body in the ﬁeld
of biomedicine. The various contributions describe the
philosophical as well as theological, sociological, psycho-
logical and historical aspects behind the biomedical
manipulation of the human body and its implications,
providing ultimately the impression that the reductive-
physical concept of the body is, for multiple reasons,
insufﬁcient in addressing the problems within biomedicine.
The ﬁrst part of the book considers the topic of the ‘‘body
as mirror’’ (‘‘Ko ¨rper als Spiegel’’) with contributions dis-
cussing, on the one hand, the (surgical) interventions on the
human body, from which new, sometimes strange, even
monstrouslivingbeingsdevelop(Stoff);whileinvolving,on
the other hand, what appears at ﬁrst glance to be harmless
interventions, such as attaching an artiﬁcial limb, which
addresses the topic of socially integrating individuals with
disabilities(Meuter).Thistopicisdealtwithbyotherauthors
here, especially within the section on ‘‘Body as foreign
substance’’ (‘‘Ko ¨rper als Fremdko ¨rper’’). Different diseases
and disabilities, especially with regard to their various
treatments, evoke, respectively,disparate reactions which in
turn bring other, especially ethical, problems into play. In
manycases,thesubjectivewishfor‘‘normalcy’’bearssucha
degree ofimportancethat itforcesethical problemseasily to
the margins of relevancy (Lundin). In cases involving neu-
roimplants for the hearing disabled, though, moral problems
associated with transplantations do surface because as a
socialgroup,thehearingimpairedhaveastrongformofself-
identity (Bentele; see also Leach Scully).
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subjects dealt with in the ﬁrst sections are once again
re-explored, and, within the last contribution, are placed in
a further ethical-philosophical framework, allowing the
problem cases to be discussed from a broadening per-
spective (Schicktanz). It becomes clear that the natural
scientiﬁcally technical view of the body is namely a valid,
at times necessary, means for conceptualizing the human
body. But in terms of ethical questions that arise from
contact with the human body, other, anthropological and
normative, considerations take on critical importance when
making decisions in biomedicine. This can be convincingly
demonstrated with the example of morally assessing the
commercialization of the human body and its respective
parts (Herrmann).
The images distributed throughout the entire volume
from the ﬁlm ‘‘Transposed Bodies/Fremdko ¨rper’’ do not
occur as simple illustrations, a point understood clearly
through the accompanying texts. Certain contributions
show clearly what the ramiﬁcations are in transplantations
now made available, such as heart transplants (Decker) or
limb transplants (Vogt et al.), and what serious effects
these manipulations may have.
The revealing quality of the work presented here on
biomedical interventions from differing perspectives and
from varying concrete levels offers the reader a profound
and at times surprisingly fresh insight into the prob-
lematic state of our body image that exists today and
will most probably exist, in a more intensiﬁed form, in
the future.
Uta Mu ¨ller
Tu ¨bingen, Germany
Gesang, B.: 2007, Perfektionierung des Menschen.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 176 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-
019560-6. Price: €19.95.
Modern biomedicine presents a lot of tools to treat
severe suffering and better up the quality of life of patients
with a variety of diseases. However, many of these bio-
medical tools can be used—and some of them actually are
used—off-label ‘‘beyond therapy’’ to augment and enhance
the condition of medically healthy people. This has forced
a long and ever enduring debate on ethical, legal and social
aspects of this highly pressing issue.
Beginning with a chapter on ideas, methods, and limits
of enhancement technologies like genetic engineering,
implantable technological devices, psychopharmacology
and different approaches to prolong the human lifespan,
Bernward Gesang presents an ethical evaluation of
enhancements in general based on his utilitarian position
called ‘‘humane utilitarianism’’ (humaner Utilitarismus).
Whereas the second chapter deals with the question what a
future society of enhanced beings would be like, the third
addresses individual risks of enhancement technologies.
More general objections to enhancements based on human
nature are critically evaluated and—not in every point
convincingly—refused in chapter four. Finally the book
closes with considerations on individual and social conse-
quences of anti-aging. In the end the author gives a brief
summary of his main conclusions on one single page pre-
sented as recommendations on the regulation of different
kinds of enhancement.
Throughout the book Gesang presents several distinc-
tions of possible enhancements. Although he holds that
central enhancements are more problematic than liberal,
mental more than bodily, and radical more than moderate
ones, most of them are permissible, some even a duty to be
provided and paid for by society. Some of the more
problematic enhancements like radical bodily and moder-
ate mental enhancements should be permissible only by a
step by step procedure presented as a compromise between
liberal and conservative argumentations. The only intru-
sions he wants to prohibit are those which will make a body
unrecognizable as a human body and radical mental
enhancements. With respect to children he has two further
demands: the enhancement should be moderate and proven
on adults. Parents have a duty to provide them with health-
enhancements and anti-aging.
Confronted with these mere theoretical considerations
on enhancements and the very liberal and permissive rec-
ommendations, the reader who wishes to know how this
would work in concrete practice will miss an application of
the recommendations to already available enhancement
technologies. Confronting the—at least hypothetical,
sometimes highly speculative—argumentations with actu-
ally pressing enhancement practices like doping practices
in sports or cosmetic psychopharmacology based on off-
label use of Ritalin or anti-depressants like Prozac would
have provided the considerations with more persuasive
power. So, in the end they unfortunately remain mere
theoretical philosophical considerations on general futur-
istic enhancement-scenarios, which, however, is interesting
enough. Footnotes instead of endnotes would have made
the book more easily readable.
Overall, this affordable book offers to the interested and
educated newcomer into the ﬁeld of enhancement an
introductory overview on some key ethical issues. Experts
in this ﬁeld of research are provided with a philosophical
argumentation in favour of a liberal position presented in
contrast to sketches of bio-conservative’s criticisms of
enhancement procedures.
Jens Clausen
Tu ¨bingen, Germany
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123Fagot-Largeault, A., Rahman, S. and Torres, J. M.
(eds.): 2007, The Inﬂuence of Genetics on Contemporary
Thinking (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science
6). Dordrecht: Springer. 216 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4020-5663-
5. Price: €127.99.
Imagine you have dinner in a new restaurant serving
your favourite ethnic food. The waiter refuses to replace
your stained tablecloth and serves you an eclectic combi-
nation of dishes of which some are ill-prepared; however,
others are simply delicious. You feel that the meal is
overpriced, but your frustration fades away when on the
following day you ﬁnd yourself indulging in the memory of
the culinary highlights of the evening.
This edited volume might trigger similar feelings in
those expecting a well-composed compilation of reﬂections
on how genetics has inﬂuenced contemporary thinking
about health and disease, or even more broadly, about
human bodies, kinship, and sociality. Instead, we encounter
a poorly edited collection of papers on various topics
whose only commonality is that they touch upon genetics.
Organized in three main sections: ‘‘Genetics and the Life
Sciences’’; ‘‘Genetics and the Philosophy of Science: The
Reductionism Debate and Beyond’’; and ‘‘Genetics and the
Ethical, Legal and Sociological Debate’’, these contribu-
tions are more informative about what other disciplines
have to say about genetics than how genetics has inﬂu-
enced other disciplines. In addition, some are so poorly
written that they leave the reader longing for a stiff drink
(see, for example, Koichiro Matsuno, p. 34: ‘‘The scheme
of equating the successor to the predecessor is as a matter
of course upon a metaphysical stipulation of concentrating
only on synchronous interactions as dismissing sequential
ones’’).
Nevertheless, those who keep reading will be rewarded.
When judged upon their merit as stand-alone pieces some
of the chapters are highly stimulating. For example, Jean-
Yves Gofﬁ’s contribution on ‘‘The Harm of Being a
Clone’’ adds original perspectives to a debate where one
often feels that everything has been said already. Michel
Morange’s chapter on the role of genetics in deﬁning life
and death sheds light on a fascinating question which has
not received much attention so far. Anne Fagot-Largeault’s
examination of whether DNA is ‘‘revolutionizing’’ medi-
cine offers engaging reﬂections on what we really mean by
the ‘‘geneticization’’ of science and society. Finally, some
chapters in the second section of the book discuss the very
timely insight that ‘‘molecular biology itself […] has
grown to challenge gene-centrism’’ (Speybroeck et al., p.
118). This, of course, poses the (unanswered) question of
what will become of the ﬁeld of genetics (as well as of
books carrying the word in their title) when the ‘‘era of the
gene’’ is over.
Barbara Prainsack
London, UK
Cameron, N., and Mitchell, M. E.: 2007, Nanoscale:
Issues and Perspectives for the Nano Century. Hoboken,
N.J.: Wiley, ISBN: 978-0470084199. 488 pp. Price:
€64.99.
This volume aims to offer an overview of the new issues
posed by the nanoscale. The book consists of 24 contri-
butions. The ﬁrst part of the book covers a very broad range
of questions connected with policy such as, for example,
the challenges faced by insurance companies in dealing
with nanorisks (Hett), the risks of nanoparticles (Balckw-
elder) and the problem of hype (Mitchell). Surprisingly,
this section includes two contributions by transhumanists
which are not immediately related to the speciﬁc topic of
nanoscale: one is devoted to enhancement (Hughes) and
the other to the general challenges of technological
development (Bostrom).
The second part of the book analyzes the challenges
posed by nanotechnologies for regulators and for the pat-
enting process. Phelps states that the present European
regulatory system needs partial modiﬁcation and Kimbrell
calls for a life-cycle approach for the analysis of the
potential environmental hazards of nanotechnologies.
Fender highlights the vibrant patent activity in this ﬁeld.
The third part of the book takes into account the ethical
challenges posed by nanomedical applications. Cameron’s
ﬁrst contribution focuses on the general challenges posed
by the nanoscale to an ethical reﬂection by arguing that
nanoethics can be an opportunity to overcome some limi-
tations of contemporary American bioethics. The other
chapters of this section deal with speciﬁc questions
emerging from the ﬁeld of nanomedicine. Bennett-Woods
analyses the general impact of nano in the health care
sector, Hook focuses on the (legitimate) goals of medicine
and Cheshire on future visions.
The fourth part is dedicated to societal issues. Mekel and
Cameron offer an overview of the NELSI landscape, Weil
discussesthechallengesconnectedwiththecommercialization
of products and Cameron suggests important points to be
considered for policy makers, such as transparency and incor-
porating NELSI research into technological development.
This book offers a rich and diversiﬁed panorama of the
major issues at stake, particularly perspectives of risk
management (especially nanoparticles) and regulatory
issues concerns. However, the analysis of the ethical and
political challenges appears reductive. This is due to the
special attention it gives to the challenges posed by nano-
medicine, as if these were the only very speciﬁc ones, and
the tendency to view the question of enhancement as the
most important one. The book would have beneﬁted if it
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views of nature and technology. Furthermore, important
topics such as distributive justice and models of sustain-
ability come up occasionally in the single contributions,
but they are not systematically analyzed.
Arianna Ferrari
Darmstadt, Germany
Hamel, R. P. and Walter, J. J. (eds.): 2007, Artiﬁcial
Nutrition and Hydration and the Permanently Unconscious
Patient. The Catholic Debate. Washington, DC: George-
town University Press. 294 pp. ISBN 9-781589-011786.
Price: $29.95.
The debate on the treatment of patients in permanent
vegetative state (PVS) is certainly not new in bioethics: the
ﬁrst ethics committee was born in 1976 precisely to face
the case of a patient in PVS (the famous Quinlan case).
Since then, the matter has been object of innumerable
interventions focused on the question: is it obligatory to
continue the artiﬁcial nutrition and the hydration (ANH) in
a patient in PVS? But this interrogation hides other more
important issues: is the patient in PVS a dying or a serious
disabled person? Is a life deprived of relational ability still
a personal life?
This volume, edited by R. P. Hamel and J. J. Walter, is
focused on this difﬁcult issue and especially on the debate
about the appropriateness (or not) of continuing the ANH in
such patients. It should be noted that the book presents the
debate on the issue from the Catholic theological and ethical
perspective. After Part I, that contains the clinical informa-
tiononthepatientinPVSandontheANH,thevolumeoffers
ananalysisoftheCatholictraditionandthedebateontheso-
called ‘‘ordinary’’ and ‘‘extraordinary’’ means (Part II). The
Part III reports the interventions of the Catholic Church
teachingandoftheCatholicBishopsonthesubject,whilethe
Parts IV and V give space to the ethical and theological
aspects and the analysis of the discourse held by the Pope
John Paul II on March 20th 2004 on ‘‘Life-Sustaining
Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientiﬁc Advances and
Ethical Dilemmas’’. The Part VI faces the legal dimension
through the analysis of two cases: a patient in PVS and a
conscious patient but with a serious retardation.
As it can be deduced from a reading of the volume, the
positions are not that uniform as they may seem at ﬁrst
glance. The editors emphasize the need for a dialogue to
ﬁnd the morally acceptable solutions, which is certainly not
an easy task. This is because the central matter is not if the
patient in PVS is a dying or a serious disabled person and if
the NAH were obligatory. That the patient in PVS is a
living person is more than evident: this is so true if we
think that the inevitable consequence of ANH withdrawal
is death. The central matter is, ﬁrst of all, of anthropo-
logical nature: is there a difference between organic life
and personal life? Is life an available good? These key
questions have an inﬂuence on human dignity, on the
quality of life and also on the qualiﬁcation of the ANH as
‘‘therapy’’ or ‘‘care’’. The anthropological matter inﬂu-
ences also two issues that need to be considered: is the
incapability to have a relationship a limit of patients in
PVS or of whom takes care of them? Is what we do for the
patients in vegetative state, especially in terms of rehabil-
itation, really enough?
Maria Luisa Di Pietro
Rome, Italy
Quante, M.: 2007, Person. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
224 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-018190-6. Price: €19.95.
This book is a welcome exception within the vast lit-
erature on the notions of person and personal identity.
Quante offers a clear way of distinguishing and answering
various questions that are all too often blurred. The book is
thus valuable to readers seeking an introduction to these
issues, but it also provides a helpful framework to experts
on the topic.
Quante’s book is structured around a distinction
between three issues: (1) The ﬁrst topic concerns the
conditions of falling within the category of persons. (2) The
second one is about the conditions for being precisely one
person at a particular time and the same person over time
(he calls them ‘‘unity conditions’’: Einheitsbedingungen).
(3) Finally, there is a discussion on how to understand
‘‘identity’’ as an evaluative and normative relationship of a
person to herself.
(1) Here Quante distinguishes between prescriptive and
descriptive uses of the concept person. He argues that,
by focusing exclusively on the descriptive use, we can
avoid mistakes and unfruitful debates common in
bioethics. Offering separately an account of the
characteristics that make somebody a person in a
descriptive sense brings more sharply into focus the
question as to which characteristics of an individual
are of ethical relevance.
(2) Against the background of a discussion of Locke and
hiscritics,Quanteoffersausefulwayofclassifyingthe
different positions. He then discusses in detail what he
calls ‘‘the ﬁrst-personal simple theory’’ (die erst-
perso ¨nlich-einfache Theorie) and various ‘‘complex
theories.’’ He favors complex approaches—theories
that offer a non-circular account of the conditions of
diachronic unity. Such accounts formulate these con-
ditions in purely causal or functional as opposed to
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lems of the theories he discusses, Quante suggests
that—due to the evaluative character of the concept
person—it may not be possible to state conditions for
theunityofaperson.Instead,hesuggestsweformulate
unity conditions for a human organism. In this way, he
argues, we can solve the difﬁculties plaguing other
theories with respect to the question of unity.
(3) Quante’s shift to the analysis of the unity of human
organismsispartofanoverallstrategy.Someissuescan
be resolved in this way, other topics concern ‘‘identity’’
in a different sense and call for an analysis employing a
normative and evaluative vocabulary. These latter
themes he introduces through a critical discussion of
Parﬁt’s idea that ‘‘identity is not what matters.’’
According to Quante, we can understand the unity
conditions for a human person by focusing on the
conceptofahumanorganism,whereasthe‘‘identity’’of
a personality that a human being has can be understood
in terms of the notion of a biographical coherence
created and maintained through the person’s own
evaluative attitudes. Quante’s book has moved the
discussion forward. The critical attention it deserves is
notpossiblewithintheconﬁnesofabriefliterarynotice.
Logi Gunnarsson
Dortmund, Germany
Steinberg, D. (ed.): 2007, Biomedical Ethics: A Multi-
disciplinary Approach to Moral Issues in Medicine and
Biology. Lebanon, N.H.: University Press of New England.
346 pp. ISBN 978-1584656432. Price: €34.99.
This is a somewhat unusual book in the sense that it
gathers together about 115 contributions with the common
feature of having been published in the Lahey Clinic
Journal of Medical Ethics. The Lahey Clinic is in the
Boston area, David Steinberg is its Chief, Section of
Medical Ethics and the Editor of the above mentioned
Journal, which began as a newsletter in 1994.
It is therefore not surprising if, out of the 97 authors,
all but nine work in the U.S. (three are from China, three
from Canada and three from other Western countries).
The tenor of the treatment of bioethical themes or cases is
therefore marked by the North American bioethics work
of the last 30 years and the main tenets of the related
prevalent doctrines—which of course does not rule out
differences or disagreements among the authors. It should
be noted that, often, a piece responds or comments on the
one immediately preceding, with an occasional reply from
the ﬁrst author. Be it said also that, in the panel of
authors, one ﬁnds a number of the North American stars
in the ﬁeld.
Excerpted from a periodical publication, the pieces
gathered do not constitute a treatise or encyclopaedia
aiming at covering, in a structured way, the whole ﬁeld of
biomedical ethics; the book is more of the nature of a
reader. David Steinberg has arranged them in six parts: The
nature of biomedical ethics, The power of language, Novel
technologies, In the clinical arena, Ethics and the law
(exploring facets of their always interesting interface),
Ethics and the humanities, and has written an introduction
for each of the ﬁrst ﬁve parts. Part Six is made of the
reviews of 15 books, one play and one ﬁlm about ethical
issues in the health ﬁeld (life histories among others).
The collection includes contributions by such noted
experts as Daniel Callahan, George Annas, Dan Brock,
Bernard Gert, Daniel Dennett, Peter Singer, Alexander
Capron, and Robert Veatch. The volume includes discus-
sions of bioethical challenges in the clinical arena; ethical
challenges associated with advances in biotechnology,
genetics, and reproductive medicine; legal perspectives;
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia; health policy
and distributive justice; the experience of illness, and many
more critical issues. There are also contributions on clon-
ing, transgenderism, enhancement, implantable chips and
cybermedicine, as well as on somewhat exotic subjects like
‘‘Ethics for Astronauts’’ and ‘‘Bioethics in Space’’. Com-
mentary on such issues from a broad range of perspectives
adds to the book’s richness, texture, and depth.
Most of the contributions count 3 to 4 pages and are
easily perused. The language is clear and the reading
agreeable, as well as the typographical presentation. The
book is easy to consult: it includes a well-prepared index;
there is a list of the afﬁliations of the numerous authors.
Overall, interesting and substantial reading on the views of
U.S. scholars and practitioners on issues of current interest
in the large ﬁeld of bioethics.
Jean Martin
Echandens/Lausanne, Switzerland
Becchi, P.: 2008, Morte cerebrale e trapianto degli
organi. Una questione di etica giuridica. Brescia: Mor-
celliana. 200 pp. ISBN: 8837222408. Price: €12.50.
Paolo Becchi deals in this book with the debate on
neurological criteria to determine death with the aim of
presenting re-evaluations and criticisms of those criteria;
he starts from the ﬁrst ofﬁcial medical report published in
1968 by the Ad Hoc Committee, of the Harvard Medical
School, and approaches the present day debate. The neu-
rological criteria are applied when the determination of
death has to cope with irremediable injured patients, in
which brain lesions cause deep coma, unreceptivity, unre-
sponsitivity, dependence on ventilator and ﬂat EEG. In the
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became fundamental for obtaining organs to be
transplanted.
The criteria were introduced in Italy for ﬁrst time in
1969 by a decree disciplining organ procurement and
transplantation; in 1993 a law was approved by the Italian
Parliament, stating a legal deﬁnition of death as the ces-
sation of all functions of the entire brain, including brain
stem; such a deﬁnition is to be applied for all purposes of
death declaration, independently of organ procurement and
transplantation.
In Italy a critical debate on neurological criteria does not
actually exist: only a small number of Italian scholars are
informed that brain death criteria are under a deep inter-
national scrutiny since the early Nineties. Becchi explains
the most signiﬁcant reasons to re-think those criteria: there
is a conspicuous number of clinical facts reported by sev-
eral medical professionals who found impressive
inconsistency between the deﬁnition and the tests for
‘‘brain death’’. Becchi also analyses the philosophical
arguments against the purported equivalence between brain
death and human death, and discusses them from different
points of view, such as Hans Jonas’s and Peter Singer’s
ones. The use of a ‘‘new deﬁnition of death’’ crafted for
declaring the death of a patient before cardiopulmonary
arrest is criticised because it is also conceived as an attempt
to solve the problem of vital organs’ procurement and
transplantation.
In many cases actual medical experience supports
philosophical statement that brain death is not the death of
the organism. As an example, Becchi discusses evidence
collected by the U.S. physicians, Robert Truog and James
Fackler: while the deﬁnition speaks of the irreversible
cessation of all brain functions, tests simply evaluated
some of those functions. Thus, despite theoretical deﬁni-
tions, patients are declared dead when some brain functions
are still present, such as: pituitary function, the neuro-
hormonal control by hypophysis and hypothalamus, a weak
electrical activity in some areas of the neocortex, spinal
reﬂexes, some reactivity to external stimulation.
One more controversial point in discussing whole-brain
death criteria is the neurological theory underlining their
application. According to this theory, the brain is respon-
sible of the integrative unity of the body, and without a
functioning brain an organism would become a mere col-
lection of organs without any co-ordinated activity. The
U.S. neurologist Alan Shewmon, a former supporter of
brain death criteria, criticised that approach when his
clinical experience challenged the theory of the central
integrator. Dealing with paediatric patients led Shewmon to
the conclusion that important integrative functions, such as
the respiratory one, do not depend on the brain itself: in
many cases they keep on going even when the brain is
damaged and health care assistance is provided by physi-
cians. For this reason, in Shewmon’s view the theory of the
brain as the central integrator of the body does not give any
adequate justiﬁcation to brain death criteria for death
determination.
Given all these problems and inconsistencies related to
the concept of brain death, the same foundation of the
clinical practice of organ transplantation is deeply endan-
gered: brain death patients are not dead, and if so they
cannot be used to obtain organs. Becchi starts a deep and
serious discussion about conditions for obtaining organs for
transplantation, and makes proposals in which such con-
ditions are no longer dependent on neurological criteria.
This book deserves to be read by philosophers, lawyers,
health care professionals and anyone engaged in organ
procurement and transplantation.
Rosangela Barcaro
Genoa, Italy
Nussbaum, M.: 2006, Frontiers of Justice. Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 487 pp. ISBN 978-0-674-01917-1. Price:
$35.00.
In this volume, Martha Nussbaum argues that a real
social and global justice might guarantee: (1) justice to
people with physical and mental disabilities; (2) justice to
all world citizens; and (3) justice to non-human animals.
But actual contractarian theories of justice show limitations
exactly regarding these three issues. Her capabilities
approach offers insights, which are ‘‘superior to those
suggested […] by the social contract tradition’’ (p. 5).
In the following, I focus on Nussbaum’s treatment of the
ﬁrst point, which she discusses by reference to Rawls’
theory. She distinguishes classical contractarian theories
based on the promotion of the own interests through the
guarantee of reciprocal advantages on the one hand, and
contractarian theories based on the value of impartiality on
the other hand. Both kinds of theories lead to the exclusion
of disabled people. The capacities for cooperation and
coercion of people with disabilities are too much limited
and so are the advantages that are expected to be guaran-
teed by a contract. And persons with serious mental
disabilities don’t have the moral capacities for the recog-
nition of impartiality.
Rawls’ theory integrates elements of these two strains of
thought and has both of the problems. Primary: individuals
in the original position know they are ‘‘rough equals’’, i.e.
they always have a minimum of mental and physical
capacities. But disabled people don’t count as ‘‘rough
equals’’ and therefore it is not possible to recognize them as
subjects of justice. Secondly: with the original position
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123Rawls assumes a concept of person characterized by ‘‘two
moral powers’’. But this excludes individuals with mental
disabilities, who lack these powers.
Certainly the structural limits of his theory were not
unknown to Rawls. A less transparent veil of ignorance,
which excludes the knowledge about being disabled, would
implicate to give up the concept of ‘‘primary goods’’, and
thus would undermine the operability of the theory. Instead
Rawls proposes to attend to the necessities of disabled
people at the parliamentarian level. But this proposal is
convincingly criticized by Nussbaum: in this way they are
not being considered as primary subjects of justice. Dis-
abled people don’t just want to have more primary goods at
their disposal. They want other goods, which enable them
to achieve characteristic valuable human functioning, and
in this way to be integrated in the society keeping their
dignity. According to Nussbaum this kind of goods should
be expressed as ‘‘capabilities’’. She offers a reworked list
of them (pp. 76–78): ‘‘A decent society will organize
public space, public education, and other relevant areas of
public policy to support such lives and fully include them,
giving the caregivers all the capabilities on our list, and the
disabled as many of them, and as fully, as is possible’’ (p.
222). If the price for the achievement was giving up the full
operability of the theory, it would be a price worth it to be
paid to accomplish the liberal promises related to an
inclusive concept of citizenship.
The book is a valuable contribution to the discussion of
global justice, although it presupposes a good knowledge
of John Rawls’s theory of justice. The discussion of dis-
ability is probably the strength of this volume. This is
where Nussbaum takes her theory farthest with regard to
the unresolved problems of social justice.
Daniel Loewe
Tu ¨bingen, Germany
Pfaff, D. W.: 2007, The Neuroscience of Fair Play: Why
We (Usually) Follow the Golden Rule. Washington DC:
Dana Press. 240 pp. ISBN: 978-1932594270. Price $20.95.
There are at least two issues that are symptomatic for the
current debate on the explanatory reach of neuroscientiﬁc
research and practice, especially when it comes to com-
municating empirical data to the public: Firstly, the quite
positivistic approach of neuroscientiﬁc endeavour to
human traits and key features of moral decision making, an
approach that normally is led by reductionistic models of
explanation. Secondly, there is the ignorance of the meta-
theoretical assumptions, as much as of the general
conditions of data generation and interpretation within the
natural and the life sciences, which are both essential for
the evaluation of neuroscientiﬁc knowledge.
Unfortunately, both shortcomings are prominently pres-
ent in the book by Donald W. Pfaff, head of the Laboratory
of Neurobiology and Behavior at Rockefeller University.
The main theses of Pfaff0s book deal with describing how
moral behavior, metaphorically speaking, ‘‘the Golden
Rule’’ or some inherent capacity for fair play, may be a
hardwired function of the human brain (chapter 1). This
assumption, of course, is not quite as neat as it sounds. Pfaff
undertakes to develop his theses along twelve chapters,
beginning with a rough introduction into the history of ideas
of social behavior, altruism and strategies of cooperation
(chapter 2). He frankly refers to the neurobiologist’s dream
of ‘‘ﬁnding concrete, physical mechanisms underlying
behavior’’—starting with the thesis that ‘‘if the Golden Rule
is so universal, the mechanism behind it must also be rather
simple and dependable’’ (chapter 3). In the following
chapters he describes fundamental mechanisms of the so-
called neurobiology of fear, sex and parental love, socia-
bility, the chemistry of aggression, as much as of
interactions between environmental and genetic inﬂuences
on emotions and temperament (chapters 3–11). Finally,
Pfaff ambitiously comes up with the draft of ‘‘a new science
of social behavior’’ (chapter 12), drawing also normative
conclusions, which have to be seen as highly problematic
from an ethical point of view. With reference to his theses,
that ‘‘a prime candidate for a chemical turn on the brain’s
‘‘ethical switch’’ for friendly behavior—is oxytocin’’ (p.
100), Pfaff claims not only to ﬁgure out how this speciﬁc
hormone could ramped up to ‘‘promote friendly behaviors’’,
but also to ‘‘reduce the effects of male sex hormones in
some individuals’’ (p. 207).
Hence, this short literature notice is in some way a
warning to all readers who are strongly interested in
anthropological and ethical issues that per se transcend
mere descriptions of neurobiological functioning.
Lara Huber
Mainz, Germany
Levy, N.: 2007, Neuroethics: Challenges for the 21st
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 346 pp.
ISBN 978-0521687263. Price: €42.99.
Neil Levy is right: the different forms of progress made
in the sciences of the mind, including new knowledge and
new options for intervention, will be among the philo-
sophically most fascinating challenges for the 21st century.
And he is right, as his book makes clear, that this progress
is a challenge for philosophy in two respects—on a con-
ceptual and on an ethical level. Furthermore I agree with
Levy that the science of the mind will probably be the
greatest challenge for philosophy on the conceptual level
even if there will be other problems on the ethical level
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123which will be more urgent and pressing (take questions of
justice in a global world as one example). The reason why
the sciences of the mind are likely to cause conceptual
pressure both on our self-conception embedded in the
manifest image and on our philosophical theories concern
the mental, personal identity, autonomy or responsibility is
that erosions of our self-understanding as agents, subjects
of mental states and persons comes much closer to the heart
of what we care about most and what we essentially are.
Levy’s book is very useful for readers who want to ﬁnd
a ﬁrst way through all these emerging problems in this new
ﬁeld since Levy gives a well informed and detailed over-
view of most of the relevant questions. And it will be
helpful for those more familiar with debates concerning
neuroethics since Levy analyses some of the most deeply
rooted intuitions (both ethical and conceptual ones) which
very often end in misleading and implausible ethical
judgements. Levy’s overall strategy is to show that
different options like neuro-enhancement, memory-inter-
vention or mind reading cannot be shown to be ethically
wrong simply because they are new options, or that they
are intrinsically wrong so that it would be possible to argue
against them categorically. No version of the therapy-
enhancement-distinction is such that all forms of therapy
are on the right side and all forms of enhancement are on
the other. And, as Levy shows, no conception of authen-
ticity is such that it allows banning intervention into or
enhancing the mind generally. Furthermore he refutes all
categorical objections referring to questions of justice by
showing that all this can establish the need only to estimate
the options one by one and carefully take into account the
concrete aspects which might be sufﬁcient to make the use
of new technologies ethically wrong because the actual
structure of one’s society will lead to results violating
demand of justice.
Most of the arguments Levy presents and the overall
positions he defends are not new. But he presents them in
their interconnections and in a clear style avoiding
polemics as far as possible. Nowhere Levy is in danger to
be seduced by vague future scenarios (neither as utopias
nor as dystopias) and always he tries hard to give an
objective assessment of the developments. Therefore Levy
enables and encourages the reader to make up his own
mind concerning this challenge of the 21st century.
Michael Quante
Cologne, Germany
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